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Household Tax Compliance and the Shadow Economy in Central 
and Southeastern Europe 
Abstract 
This paper presents and applies a new indicator of the size of the shadow economy based 
on the estimation of tax compliance in the household sector. These estimates are 
performed for the countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe using 2001 data. 
Estimates of income declaration rates and of corresponding undeclared household income 
are computed using household consumption data as well as detailed data on household 
taxation. Specific aspects such as remittances, the role of agriculture and the impact of 




According to the terminology of Schneider and Enste (2000), one can distinguish the three 
following types of methods for measuring the size and development of the shadow 
economy: the direct approaches, the indirect approaches and the model approach. What 
follows is a short description of the traditional methods.  
 
Direct approaches to the measurement of the unofficial economy are generally 
microeconomic approaches using either survey or tax auditing methods. However, these 
methods rely heavily on the honesty of the surveyed persons and on the investigative skills 
of the auditors respectively. They may lack representativeness and can be very costly if 
done on a big scale. 
 
The indirect or indicator approaches to the estimation of the development of the hidden 
economy are in general macroeconomic approaches. These include, inter alia: the national 
accounts discrepancy method, using the gap between the income measure of GDP and 
the expenditure measure of GDP for the estimation of the shadow economy; the official 
and actual labour force discrepancy method, where a change in the official participation 
rate can be a crude estimate for a change in the informal sector activities; the transactions 
approach by Feige (1979, 1989, 1996), where, starting from the quantity equation, 
assumptions on the velocity of money and the relationship between total transactions and 
the total nominal GDP (= official + unofficial economy) are made; the currency demand 
approach by Tanzi (1980, 1983), assuming that the unofficial economy’s transactions are 
made in cash, an increase of the shadow economy would therefore result in an increase of 
currency demand; and the physical input method, e.g. by Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) 
or Lackó (1996, 1998, 1999), using data on electricity consumption for estimating the size 
of the shadow economy. Several of the indirect approaches need either the assumption of 
a base year without a shadow economy or an external estimate of the unofficial economy 2 
of a base country (e.g. Feige’s transaction approach, Tanzi’s currency demand approach 
and Lackó’s household electricity approach). The use of base years or base countries is at 
the same time one of the weaknesses of these approaches and provides, among other 
things, points of critique. 
 
Finally, the model approach, which goes back to Weck (1983) and Frey and Weck-
Hannemann (1984), deals with multiple causes (e.g. tax burden, burden of regulations, 
citizens’ attitudes towards the state) leading to the existence, growth and multiple effects 
(e.g. monetary indicators, labour market indicators, indicators of the development of the 
product market) of the black economy. 
 
Table 1 
Comparison of unofficial economy shares in % of official GDP 
according to the methods of Lackó (1999), Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), and Madzarevic-Sujster and Mikulic (2002) 
Country  Method  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Bulgaria  L  34.1  34.0  35.9  34.0 
Bulgaria  KK  33.3  42.7  41.0  56.7 
Croatia  L  38.6  39.3  40.4  36.0 
Croatia  MM  29.4  36.9  25.5  17.7 
Source: Lackó (1999), pp. 52, 47; Madzarevic-Sujster and Mikulic (2002), p. 41. 
 
Unfortunately full and uniform data coverage, which would be needed for applying the 
above-mentioned traditional methods for all countries and territories of the Balkans, is still 
lacking. This is the main reason why the literature on the shadow economy fails to provide 
results for the whole of Southeast Europe derived from using a single method. As can be 
seen from Table 1, it does not help to use results from different methods. Table 1 
compares the results (unofficial economy shares in per cent of official GDP) of the indirect 
methods by Lackó (1999), indicated as method L, by Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), 
indicated as KK, and by Madzarevic-Sujster and Mikulic (2002), indicated as MM, for 
Bulgaria and Croatia in the period 1992 to 1995. The first two are physical input methods, 
the third one is a national accounts discrepancy method. Some of the results differ quite 
substantially with respect to the method used, in terms of shares for single years as well as 
growth rates between years. 
 
Additional inputs that are of interest from the existing literature include a simple ‘rule of 
thumb’ approach to estimating the size of the shadow economy in Albania (IMF, 2003). In 
this report, the authors present a way of arriving at a ‘very rough and preliminary’ estimate 
of the size of the shadow economy using tax revenue and overall tax burden data. They 
use Bulgaria as an ‘anchor country’ for which a separate estimate of the shadow economy 
is known. They assume that the tax burden in Albania is the same as in Bulgaria, and 3 
arrive at their estimate for Albania by comparing the tax revenues between the two 
countries. This simple approach inspired us to see whether we could formulate a similar 
but more realistic approach, notably by estimating the tax burden of each country 
ourselves and avoiding the use of an anchor country. The outcome of this work is the 
household income taxation method (HITM) as presented in this paper. 
 
 
Tax evasion, tax avoidance and the shadow economy 
Our chosen base definition of the shadow economy, which we take from Mirus and Smith 
(1997), is the following: ‘economic activity which would generally be taxable were it 
reported to the tax authorities’. Hence, this would include all unreported income and barter 
activities related to legal goods and services. Activities related to illegal goods and 
services, i.e. criminal activities, are not part of this concept. Furthermore we must add that 
the expression ‘economic activity’ should be understood as productive economic activity, in 
other words, that generates value added.  
 
This definition of the shadow economy can be expressed according to the OECD 
terminology
1: the shadow economy as defined here includes all of what is called 
‘underground activity’ (legal activities that are deliberately hidden in order to avoid taxation 
and/or compliance with regulations), and the undeclared parts (from a fiscal point of view) 
of ‘informal activity’ (activities conducted by unincorporated enterprises in the household 
sector) and ‘production of households for own final use’ (self-explanatory) to the extent that 
these should be subject to taxation. 
 
One important clarification must be made at this point: we are not attempting to measure 
‘missing GDP’ (often referred to as ‘non-observed GDP’). The issue of missing GDP, 
meaning value added that is somehow not captured by the official measure of GDP and 
which, when found, should be added to officially recorded GDP to obtain ‘actual GDP’, is a 
separate issue and a separate, different quantity. The issue of missing GDP is the issue of 
the exhaustiveness of the national accounts, which national statistical agencies try to tackle 
using a variety of direct and indirect methods. These efforts are supported by several 
international institutions, and joint efforts to specify methods designed to achieve 
exhaustiveness can be found notably in OECD (2002a). Attempting to achieve an 
exhaustive estimate of GDP and its components is a complementary exercise to the 
estimate of the shadow economy which would make estimates of the size of the shadow 
economy more precise and more reliable, but they are distinct quantities. The shadow 
economy as defined in this paper may in principle be completely captured by the official 
measure of GDP. This would happen if the official measure of GDP were fully exhaustive. 
In practice full exhaustiveness is generally not reached, and so there is always some non-
                                                                 
1   As detailed in OECD (2002a). 4 
observed GDP, but the shadow economy as defined in our current framework will typically 
be a larger figure. 
 
The second necessary clarification concerns the way in which activities escape taxation. In 
this report we consider tax evasion and tax avoidance as a single activity, namely the 
activity of not declaring incomes that should generally be taxed. Whether this is done by 
underreporting income (e.g. by forging or fabricating documents) or by legally exploiting 
taxation law loopholes is not relevant in our context. 
 
In this report we purposely choose to limit ourselves to tax evasion and avoidance by 
households as a contributing factor to the shadow economy. In a more comprehensive 
framework one should add the contribution from the corporate sector (from non-declaration 
of profits) as well. Having said that we feel that our approach is quite comprehensive 
because our starting point is final household consumption as reported in the countries’ 
national accounts. This final consumption can be thought to have at its origin all kinds of 
recycled or grey incomes, along with declared, formal ones, although admittedly we do not 
deal with the extra complication of (hidden) capital flight.  
 
In order to motivate our methodology and clarify our basic assumptions, we start off by 
re-writing the ‘factor remuneration’ equation for GDP taking explicit account of undeclared 
incomes. We consider ‘actual GDP’, implying that there could be some value added 
spread between informal wages and informal profits (gross operating surpluses in this 
case) which is not captured by official GDP at market prices. 
 
NCVA TLSP W W
TLSP W TLSP GVA GDP
I F I F
M M BP MP
- + P + P + + =
+ P + = + =
 
 
GDPMP  =  Official Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices 
GVABP  =  Official Gross Value Added at Basic Prices 
WM, WF, WI  =  Measured, Formal and Informal Gross Wages 
PM, PF, PI  =  Measured, Formal and Informal ‘Profits’ (Gross Operating Surpluses  
    and Mixed Incomes) 
TLSP  =   Taxes Less Subsidies on Products 
NCVA  =   Non-Captured Value Added (‘missing GDP’) 
 
Here we define the size of the shadow economy (‘informal sector’) as the sum of informal 
wages and informal profits. One must distinguish at this stage between measured 
quantities and formal quantities. Formal wages are wages declared to the tax authorities. 
Measured wages are those found in the national accounts. These will typically be larger, as 
statistical offices use a variety of techniques to get closer to the actual figure, but of course 5 
they will not capture all informal wages. Of course we do not know the sizes of informal 
wages and informal profits and we also do not know the value of non-captured value 
added. In other words we have, at this stage, one equation and three unknowns. 
 
What we do know is that households, regardless of how they obtained their incomes, will 
consume a substantial share of it, while using the rest either for savings or for paying 
taxes. So if we cannot find out about informal wages made in the domestic economy 
directly, we can on the other hand make an estimate of total household income starting 
from household final consumption as recorded in the national accounts. To the extent that 
some estimations of initially non-observed economic activities are made by the statistical 
agencies
2, so that the published figure for household final consumption can be considered 
to be (almost) exhaustive, this way of estimating total household income may be 
considered to be a good estimate
3. Once we have total household income, we will have 
gained additional information that will help us to estimate informal incomes. 
 
Total household income includes both formal and informal wages, as well as all other kinds 
of incomes, notably received social benefits (pensions, unemployment, maternity etc.), 
remittances from abroad, other transfers from government, transfers from foreign or 
domestic aid agencies, transfers from domestic individuals, incomes in kind, consumption 
of household-produced goods (e.g. own production of food and beverages) and so on. 
Again, some of this total household income may be recorded in official GDP while some of 
it may not. This is not our prime issue of concern in this research. 
 
Using the concept of total household income, and noting the sum of non-wage incomes as 
OHI (Other Household Incomes) we can re-write the GDP equation as follows: 
 
OHI NCVA TLSP OHI W W GDP I F I F MP - - + P + P + + + =  
OHI W W THI I F + + =  
OHI NCVA TLSP THI GDP I F MP - - + P + P + =  
 
Finally we re-group the last three terms and rename the corporate sector as the ‘other 
sector’, obtaining: 
 
D - + = TOI THI GDP     where  OHI NCVA TLSP + + - = D . 
 
                                                                 
2   See OECD (2002a) for guidelines and methods as to how this is done, and UNECE (2003) for an international survey 
of currently implemented and planned practices.  
3   There are, in fact, no clear alternatives. Aggregated data from household budget surveys are already used by statistical 
agencies to refine the estimate of household final consumption and one would not make any gains by aggregating 
these data oneself. 6 
Coming back to the issue of formal versus informal incomes, which we will refer to as 
declared and undeclared incomes, we may write: 
 
D - + + + = D - + = UOI DOI UHI DHI TOI THI GDP  
 
where: 
THI, TOI  = Total Household (resp. Other Sector) Income;  
DHI, DOI  = Declared (Formal) (resp. Other Sector) Household Income; 
UHI, UOI  = Undeclared (Informal) (resp. Other Sector) Household Income. 
 
With this notation, we define the size of the shadow economy income (SEI) as: 
 
UOI UHI SEI + =  
 




H = b ;
GDP
TOI
O = b ;
THI
DHI
H = l ;
TOI
DOI
O = l  
 
lH , lO  =  Household (resp. Other) Income Declaration Rate; 
bH , bO  =  Total Household (resp. Other) Income divided by GDP. 
 
Now that we have laid down our working framework, we turn to the issue of tax evasion 
and avoidance. We have at our disposal official revenues from personal taxes, taxes on 
consumption (VAT and excise taxes) and social contribution schemes. We define statutory 
tax rates which apply to total household income. At this stage the weighting is important. 
THI includes income sources which are exempt from certain taxes such as personal 
income tax and social security contributions, and so our overall statutory tax rates must be 
computed accordingly. 
 
We have the following variables: 
 
THTR/GDP =  Total Household Tax Revenue as a share of GDP; 
SHTR   =  Statutory Household Tax Rate; 
 
where THTR/GDP = (ITR + SSR + VAR + ETR) / GDP. This corresponds to: personal 
income tax revenue (ITR), employee social security contribution revenue (SSR), value 
added or the respective sales tax revenue (VAR) and excise tax revenue (ETR). The 
statutory household tax rate (SHTR) is the average statutory tax rate that includes these 
four types of taxes. We explain how to estimate SHTR in the next section. 7 
 
Turning to the relationship between tax revenue and the statutory rate, we have: 
 
SHTR THI SHTR DHI THTR H ￿ ￿ = ￿ = l  
 











H H = ￿ = = l b  
At this stage we know neither bH nor lH , only their product. We will overcome this issue by 
making a direct estimate of THI based on final household consumption. This in turn will 
yield bH, which in turn will enable us to estimate  lH. Thanks to this we will be able to 
compute an estimate of the shadow economy share generated by households. 
 






SEIH l b l b b - = - = - = =  
 
SEIH  = Shadow Economy Income due to Households / GDP 
  = Undeclared Household Income / GDP 
 
This quantity is what the HITM method estimates. In this perspective, we may now define 
in words what we mean by SEIH, namely: ‘the share in GDP of household income which 
should be subject to taxation, but is not’.  
 
In order to make such a figure comparable with other estimations found in the literature on 
the shadow economy or with those made by statistical agencies, one would need to 
convert this variable so that it expresses a quantity of value added, rather than a quantity of 
income. In this paper we stick to estimates based on income, although we plan to make 
the needed adjustments in future versions of our research. The estimates we present in 
this paper should therefore not be directly compared to other estimates in the literature, 
although they provide useful information by giving the volume of undeclared income, as 
well as a corresponding estimate of the household income declaration rate, which may 
itself be used as an indicator for the shadow economy, as well as its traditional use for 
discussing tax compliance. 
 8 
Determining total household income (THI) 
The first necessary step to enable us to produce estimates of the size of the shadow 
economy is to quantify total household income. Obviously households use their income 
either for consumption or for savings (which may include cash hoardings) or for paying 
taxes. Now we know what households pay in taxes in total because we know total tax 
incomes at the national level for all countries by adding incomes from income tax 
collection, excise taxes, VAT, as well as the appropriate share of social security 
contributions that are paid in. We also have an estimate of how much households 
consume in total thanks to the expenditure breakdown of GDP found in the national 
accounts which gives us household final consumption. The only remaining issue is 
household savings. To estimate the household savings rate for those countries (especially 
Balkan countries) where it is not readily available, we decided to use averages across 
households from household budget surveys. Although the amounts for total income and 
total expenditure computed from household survey data are always too low
4, we make the 
assumption that the ratios between the various expenditure categories and total household 
income are consistent with reality. In order to compute estimates of net savings rates, we 
add all types of savings, notably unspent income (the difference between average 
household income and average household expenditure), increases in deposits, 
investments in housing
5 and livestock, and debt reduction and we subtract all types of 
dissavings, namely the sum of all newly incurred loans and debts as well as decreases in 
savings (e.g. decreases in deposits). Noting the savings rate (with regard to total 
household income) as s, we now write down THI as: 
PaidTaxes THI THC PaidTaxes SAVINGS THC THI + ￿ + = + + = s  
 











Determining the Statutory Household Tax Rate (SHTR) 
SHTR = Statutory Household Tax Rate =  
AIT + ESS + (1 – AIT – ESS) * (1 - SVR) * (VAT + ECR * AET) 
 
                                                                 
4   Estimates of household final consumption using household survey averages (and then multiplying by the number of 
households) yield totals that are generally too low. One item which is problematic is the imputed rents for home-owners 
that are calculated for household final consumption. 
5   This does not include regular maintenance work on one’s own property such as replacing old furniture or re-painting 
existing walls. It refers to new investment, for example paying into a mortgage scheme or acquiring extra land or 
building an extension or acquiring additional livestock. 9 
Quantifying the statutory household tax rate (SHTR) includes the estimation of an average 
income tax rate (AIT) and an employee social security rate (ESS). This is an easier task in 
the second case, as it is in most cases a flat rate. It is more difficult in the first case, with 
most countries having a  progressive income taxation. AIT has to be estimated by 
calculating a simple average of the tax brackets’ tax rates, including the first tax bracket of 
0%. Additionally, figures of AIT and ESS have to be corrected inter alia by the shares of 
remittances and state current transfers to the households, as this type of income is often 
not being taxed by direct taxes and social security contributions. Then, the value added tax 
(VAT) or the respective sales tax has to be applied to the share of the remaining household 
income, after being reduced by the AIT and the ESS, reduced by the savings rate (SVR). 
On top of that, an average excise tax rate (AET) is being applied to the share of 
consumption, determined by the excised goods consumption rate (ECR). The AET can be 
estimated by using an average of all available excise tax rates for e.g. tobacco, beer, soft 
drinks, coffee, perfume and various types of gasoline and oil. In many cases, the actual 
rates are not available. Instead we have tax rates based on physical quantities rather than 
ad valorem. Therefore one can estimate the relevant excise rates using the prices of the 
most common types of local cigarettes and gasoline. This is what we have done for all the 
countries analysed. 
 
The information on the tax structure of the particular countries and territories was taken 
from various publications as for example IMF country reports
6 and the Stability Pact’s tax 
policy assessment (see Stability Pact, 2003). With the help of information from the finance 
ministries and secondary literature (e.g. Ivanov et al., 2002, 2003, Jarass and Obermair, 
2000, Deloitte & Touche, 2002, KPMG, 2003), it was tried in all cases to correct the data to 
fit especially for the year 2001. 
 
Estimating the average income tax rate is probably the most difficult task. Some countries 
and territories have introduced a flat rate (i.e. the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia
7 and Montenegro, Kosovo
8, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) while all the others have 
progressive income taxation
9. In this current version of our work the following simplifying 
assumption was made: AIT was estimated by calculating a simple average of the tax 
brackets’ tax rates, including the first tax bracket of 0%. As the average of the countries 
with progressive taxation has about 5 tax brackets, this leads to approximately 20% of the 
income being considered as untaxed. Personal allowances are assumed for now to be 
                                                                 
6   Albania: IMF CR 03 64; Bosnia and Herzegovina: IMF CR 00 77; Bulgaria: IMF WP 01 11, Stability Pact (2003); 
Croatia: IMF CR 00 22, Stability Pact (2003); Macedonia: IMF CR 02 48; Romania: IMF CR 01 16; Serbia and 
Montenegro: IMF CR 02 103, Stability Pact (2003); Kosovo: IMF (2002). 
7   Though the system here is more complex as on top of the flat 14% withholding rate an additional surtax is imposed on 
income in excess of a certain threshold – therefore the same 19% flat rate as in Montenegro was also assumed to be 
valid for Serbia. 
8   In 2001, Kosovo had neither a personal income tax nor social security contributions. 
9   Interestingly, in Republika Srpska, the tax structure is regressive. 10 
included in this figure. The complicating issue is that it is difficult to know the ad valorem 
equivalent value of the allowances (e.g. child allowances, personal allowances), as they 
are in most cases described in money values, unless one has more information on the 
income distribution for an average household. This issue is one which we are currently 
addressing. At this stage we can say, however, that our estimates for the statutory income 
and social security rates for the four OECD countries of our sample (Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) are in line with OECD (2002b) in which average statutory 
income tax and social security contribution rates are computed for the average 
manufacturing employee, depending on whether he/she is married or not, and/or has no 
child or two children. Our goal for the final version of this paper will be to use our estimate 
of total household income alongside data on the income distribution in order to construct 
an appropriately-weighted statutory personal income tax rate which takes all deductions 
and allowances into account in the correct way. At the moment we applied only allowances 
and deductions in the cases where they were provided as percentage shares of the 
income (i.e. in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska and 
Slovenia). In the cases of flat income tax countries where the information on allowances 
and deductions were not given in percentage shares of the income, allowances and 
deductions were estimated to be 20%.
10 
 
In the case of Albania and Romania, where agricultural income is exempted from income 
taxation, the tax base of AIT was reduced by the share of agricultural income in total 
household income.
11 For Albania this share is 49.1% in 2001 and for Romania the share is 
13.4%. It is worth mentioning that in Albania 71.6% of employment is engaged in the 
private agricultural sector and that in Romania agriculture and forestry account for 40.9% 
of employment. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, where agriculture 
represents less than 5% of GDP, agricultural income is deductible too.
12 A similar 
procedure had to be applied for calculating ESS all over Central and Southeastern Europe, 
as only employees and/or employers have to make social security contributions. 
Additionally, figures of AIT and ESS had to be corrected by the shares of remittances and 
state current transfers to the households
13, as this type of income is not being taxed by 
direct taxes and social security contributions. For Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Estonia, 
Latvia, Poland and Slovenia, state current transfers had to be reduced by the share of 
pensions as the latter are taxed in these countries. In the region, Kosovo has the highest 
ratio of remittances to GDP (30%) but in this case no correction had to be made due to the 
missing income taxation in 2001. In Serbia and Montenegro and in Albania private 
                                                                 
10   Only in Serbia and Montenegro, 10% were used, as it is said that there are no general deductions beside the social 
security contributions and allowances. 
11   The data on agriculture in per cent of GDP and total employment are taken from the wiiw Database. 
12   50% of agricultural income can be deducted in the Czech Republic, while the information for Hungary is somewhat 
unclear. Nevertheless full deductibility was assumed. The case of Slovakia was treated similarly as sole income from 
agriculture is taxed at a negligible rate. In Poland, income from non-specialized agricultural activities is exempted. 
13   The sources for  the data on remittances and the current transfers can be found in various IMF country reports. 11 
remittances accounted for over 13% of GDP in 2001. State current transfers to households 
range in this sample from only 3% in Kosovo to almost 20% in Poland. Finally, for most of 
the countries AIT had to be corrected for the ESS rate, as in most of the cases, social 
security contributions are deductible.
14 
 
In the second stage of estimations required for SHTR, the value added tax (VAT) or the 
respective sales tax was applied to the remaining household income, after being reduced 
by the AIT, the ESS and the savings rate (SVR).
15 VAT or sales taxes in the region range 
between 15% (in Kosovo) and 25% (in Hungary). In most other countries it is 20%. On top 
of that an average excise tax rate (AET) is applied to the share of the remaining income as 
determined by the excised goods consumption rate (ECR)
16. The AET was estimated by 
using an average of all available excise tax rates for tobacco, alcohol and gasoline. In most 
cases, the actual rates were not available. Instead we had tax rates based on physical 
quantities rather than ad valorem. In those cases we estimated the relevant excise rates 
using the prices of the most common types of local cigarettes and gasoline. Again at this 
stage there is room for improvement provided sufficiently detailed data can be found. 
 
In order to estimate the SHTR on the state level of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Serbia 
and Montenegro, statutory tax rates of the entities and the republics, respectively, were 
combined with the help of a GDP-based key. Thus, for the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska a relationship of 3 to 2 was assumed and for Serbia 
and Montenegro 12 to 1. 
 
 
Determining tax revenues from households 
The next task is to compute the total household tax revenues (THTR) in 2001
17. For this 
purpose, data on the consolidated general government fiscal operations from various IMF 
country reports were used. THTR includes personal income tax revenue (ITR), employee 
social security contribution revenue (SSR), value added or the respective sales tax 
revenue (VAR) and excise tax revenue (ETR).  
 
As, in most cases, revenues from social security contributions are generally not indicated 
separately for the employees and the employers, it had to be corrected for the share of 
nominal employer social security rates in the total nominal social security rate. Similarly, in 
the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, the original data on the revenue from 
direct taxes was not split into a personal income and enterprise profit tax revenue for the 
                                                                 
14   However, in the case of Albania, no information on the deductibility of social security contributions was available. 
15   One remaining improvement that we wish to bring to our method is to take into account the taxation of savings. 
16   This was estimated with the help of household surveys and includes the consumption shares of tobacco, alcohol and 
fuel. 
17   For Poland consolidated general government revenue data were found only for 2000. 12 
general budget. For Bosnia and Herzegovina  and its entities, the revenue data were 
corrected with the help of the share of income tax revenue in direct tax revenues of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For Macedonia, information from the central 
government was employed. 
 
For all countries VAT and excise tax revenue figures were corrected by the share of net 
tourism income in GDP. The justification for this adjustment is that VAT and excise tax 
incomes due to goods and services consumed domestically by tourists from abroad are 
not part of domestic household taxation revenue. Indeed we do not include estimates of 
the funds brought in by foreign tourists in our definition of total household income. Our 
concept of household taxation is purely domestic and so this correction is necessary. For 
countries with large revenues from tourism this correction makes a substantial difference to 
the final estimates, for example for Croatia (net tourism income is 13% of GDP) which has 




In this section we present the results of our (preliminary) estimation results for seven 
countries (and five territories) of Southeast Europe (SEE) and for the eight Central and 
East European Accession Countries (AC). All the results are point estimates. The issue of 
precision is discussed in the next section. 
 
Overall the estimation results are in the range of what one would expect for most countries. 
The average for Southeast Europe is higher than the average for the accession countries. 
Albania and Kosovo have the highest estimates, followed by Romania, Macedonia and 
Bulgaria. Perhaps more surprisingly, the estimates for Serbia and Montenegro (excluding 
Kosovo) and for Bosnia and Herzegovina (and the territories therein) are relatively low and 
more comparable  to the levels found in the accession countries. These results are in 
contrast with recent literature on the region, notably Gligorov (2003) and Gligorov, 
Landesmann and Holzner (2003) which had led us to expect higher estimates. These two 
countries warrant further investigations. The efficiency of tax collection may indeed be 
relatively good in both countries, but we suspect that household final consumption as well 
as GDP may be incorrectly measured in Serbia and Montenegro. Regarding Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, we copied the beta (THI/GDP) from Serbia and Montenegro as the former 
does not have national accounts in the usual sense. This may also have influenced the 
result. As for the accession countries, Poland has the highest estimate (perhaps not 
surprisingly, given its large agricultural sector) while the lowest estimates are for Estonia 
and Slovenia. Latvia and Lithuania have higher estimates than Estonia. Though we may  
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Table 2 
Estimates of shadow economy contribution from households, 2001 
  ß  SHTR  THTR/GDP  ß*Lambda Lambda  SEIH 
  Total household 
income as 





tax revenue as 













SEE average  85%  38%  21%  55% 64%  30% 
Albania  88%  30%  11%  35% 40%  52% 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
85%  40%  26%  64% 76%  21% 
  FBiH  85%  41%  27%  66% 78%  19% 
  RS  85%  37%  22%  59% 69%  26% 
Bulgaria  78%  38%  17%  44% 56%  34% 
Croatia  75%  49%  28%  57% 76%  18% 
Macedonia  88%  54%  26%  49% 55%  39% 
Romania  81%  41%  14%  35% 43%  46% 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 
85%  36%  24%  66% 77%  19% 
  Serbia  85%  36%  24%  66% 78%  19% 
  Montenegro  85%  36%  21%  58% 69%  27% 
Kosovo  104%  18%  10%  58% 56%  45% 
           
AC average  72%  44%  22%  50% 69%  22% 
Czech Republic  67%  39%  19%  48% 72%  18% 
Estonia  77%  53%  32%  60% 78%  17% 
Hungary  70%  45%  22%  49% 70%  21% 
Latvia  74%  40%  19%  49% 66%  26% 
Lithuania  75%  37%  19%  50% 67%  25% 
Poland  78%  48%  22%  47% 60%  31% 
Slovakia  65%  41%  18%  44% 67%  21% 
Slovenia  72%  50%  27%  55% 76%  17% 
Source: Own estimates. 
 
not directly compare our estimates with those made by Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) for 
the period 1999-2000
18, we briefly compare the positions of the estimates within each 
estimation set distribution resulting from each approach. The main differences concern the 
estimates for Slovenia and Croatia on the one hand (where our estimates place them at 
the low end of the distribution, while Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) attribute relatively 
                                                                 
18   We use this set of Schneider estimates as it covers the Balkan countries as well, except Macedonia. 14 
larger estimates to them) and those for Albania and Romania on the other hand, which 
HITM places at the top end of the distribution while they are estimated to have only 
average-sized shadow economies by Schneider and Klinglmair (2004). The results for 
Latvia in particular are very different. It has the largest estimate among those of Schneider 
and Klinglmair, but is close to the average according to HITM. On the other hand both sets 
of estimates place Bulgaria, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Hungary in similar positions 
with respect to each distribution. 
 
The main reason for these differences seems to be linked to the specific focus of HITM on 
household taxation, whereas the DYMIMIC model takes multiple causes and indicators 
into account
19. In particular, Romania has low tax revenues compared to its statutory tax 
rate, while Croatia, Slovenia and Estonia have rather high tax revenues compared to their 
respective statutory tax rates.  
 
 
Further methodological discussion – data issues and points of improvement 
Coverage 
At this stage the issue of the coverage of our estimates, which focus strictly on the 
household contribution to the shadow economy, naturally comes to mind. Without loss of 
generality, we can say that a share of informal corporate income (informal gross operating 
surplus and mixed income) does end up as informal wages. So it may be said that SEIH 
captures some of the informal income generated by the corporate sector as well, but not all 
of it. Furthermore, the share of informal gross operating surplus which contributes to 
informal wages escapes not just household taxation but corporate tax as well. Taken 
together, these comments imply that the statutory tax rate, if based purely on those taxes 
that apply to the household sector, will be lower than it should be, so that the correct size of 
shadow economy income will certainly be higher than the HITM estimates. As for the 
corporate sector itself, again without loss of generality, one can say that some share of its 
informal incomes are not used to pay informal wages, but are either re-invested in the 
firm’s assets or somehow hoarded or deposited abroad. One notes here that informal 
incomes that are split between business associates and then spent on consumption goods 
and services on the domestic market are equivalent to informal wages. We are therefore 
left with two missing items which HITM cannot account for: re-invested informal profits and 
hoarded or exported (informal) capital. These two items would require a separate 
estimation procedure. We also recall here that HITM does not enable us to account for 
cash hoardings by households either. In the case of households however cash hoardings 
interact with savings. Whether or not households prefer hoarding cash (e.g. in foreign 
                                                                 
19   It is difficult to be more specific in interpreting the output of DYMIMIC as Schneider’s publications tend to only explain 
the general principle of his method. One can only assume that the other factors considered by DYMIMIC somehow 
compensate the effect from tax compliance for the countries where estimates differ substantially. 15 
currency) to classical savings accounts at domestic banks, the issue relevant to the 
accuracy of HITM is whether or not the savings rate estimated from household budget 
surveys is correct. Here again, a complementary estimation exercise would be helpful, the 
aim of which would be to describe the true dynamic of household savings. Finally, as 
previously stated, a complementary framework needs to be designed if one wishes to 
obtain value added estimates rather than income estimates. All of these improvements will 
be attempted for future or complementary versions of our research on this topic.  
 
Data issues 
As pointed out in previous sections, data availability is a major constraint. In order to 
produce a more reliable estimate of the statutory household tax rate (SHTR), it is 
necessary to gather extensive information not only on the tax structure, but also on the 
income distribution. This income distribution must itself be corrected since it will generally 
be an under-estimation / under-declaration of the true income distribution. At this stage 
some distributional assumptions concerning the share of underground or informal incomes 
across different income quantiles would become necessary. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
Because we have not defined a classical model with error terms and relevant distributional 
assumptions, it is not immediately obvious how we should quantify the reliability of our 
estimates. For this purpose we are faced with two options: either stick to our deterministic 
framework and use value ranges to conduct a sensitivity analysis, or define a stochastic 
framework, make distributional assumptions, and then construct the appropriate 
confidence intervals. Our preference is to use a deterministic sensitivity analysis (e.g. by 
how much does our estimate for country X change if the statutory tax rate were higher 
(lower) by 3 percentage points). The reason is that the construction of distributional 
assumptions regarding the estimates of the statutory tax rate, the savings rate and final 
household consumption would be, in our view, artificial and more questionable than a 
deterministic sensitivity analysis. It may be that we would have to use non-normal 
distributions, and these would in any case have to be calibrated to make value intervals 
that we know to be incorrect extremely unlikely (or of probability zero). In light of this, it 
makes more sense in our view to define ‘by hand’ the value ranges that can be justified 
with regard to the data that we have, and then produce lower and higher bounds for our 
estimates. We are currently in the process of defining what the value ranges should be. 
Initial tests suggest variations within plus or minus 5 percentage points around our point 
estimates. The most sensitive input is the statutory VAT rate. The statutory personal 
income tax and employee social security contribution rates are also quite sensitive. The 




In this research we sought to develop an independent method for estimating the size of the 
shadow economy based on tax evasion and avoidance in the household sector. Our 
approach still requires certain improvements notably with regard to the issues of savings 
and cash hoardings, the non-captured informal activities of the corporate sector, and the 
taxation of savings. We have also been made aware of the inherent difficulties linked to 
estimating statutory household tax rates for a large number of countries. On the other 
hand, we would like to think that our approach contributes to the economic research on the 
shadow economy. Our work provides alternative estimates which give information on the 
shadow economy for a large number of countries, and some interesting discussions could 
perhaps arise in more detailed comparisons that could be made with more established 
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